INTRODUCTION
The emphasis placed on continuing vocational training (CVT) in policy debates relating to economic development, the labour market and social inclusion has increased over the past twenty years and shows no signs of diminishing. Skills and knowledge are regarded as critical determinants of the rate of economic growth and important sources of comparative advantage. The diff usion of information and communication technologies (ICT) and technology-intensive production methods is said to have created a need for more highly-and multi-skilled workers in the manufacturing sector, while the growth of new service sector industries has created a need for an increased supply of 'knowledge workers'. While the nature, extent and implications of these developments are matters of debate, there can be little doubt that the creation of mechanisms to ensure that an adequate level of investment in training and development occurs is a pre-requisite for economic development and therefore represents an important task for the state. In many European countries, employers and trade unions also play an important role in labour administration activities relating to training and development. Vocational training has been a classic arena for the development of corporatist arrangements, whereby the state delegates responsibilities to the representative organizations of employers and employees (Schmitter and Streeck 1986) as a means of avoiding market failure.
Training has also become an increasingly important issue for collective bargaining, although it must be admitted that joint regulation of training (where it exists) remains at an embryonic stage in many regions of the world (Bourget 2006: 6) . Collective bargaining in respect of training is most in evidence within the European Union (EU) and the following discussion therefore devotes considerable attention to this region. The chapter begins with a discussion of theoretical considerations and empirical evidence relating to the impact of collective bargaining on training. It goes on to explore at greater length the interests of employers and workers in relation to CVT and the content of collective agreements relating to training. Drawing on examples from EU member states (and Norway), the chapter explores the various ways in which collective bargaining might enhance CVT provision, as well as potential obstacles to the development and extension of collective bargaining on this issue.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND TRAINING: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
Economists and industrial relations researchers have off ered competing analyses of the relationship between collective bargaining and training. Accounts rooted in human capital theory tend to assume that collective bargaining has negative consequences for training. Human capital theory predicts that where competitive market conditions and wage fl exibility pertain, workers and fi rms will have incentives to invest optimally in 'general' and 'fi rm-specifi c' forms of training (Becker 1975) . Trade unions, it is assumed, seek to compress wage diff erentials and introduce 'rigidities' (for example by promoting seniority rules), resulting in distorted investment incentives and sub-optimal training outcomes (Mincer 1983) . By contrast, institutional economic theory suggests a number of ways in which the presence of unions and collective bargaining might encourage training. One familiar argument is that trade unions help to reduce the extent of quitting by providing employees with a collective 'voice' with which to express their grievances (Freeman and Medoff 1984) . Lower labour turnover might in turn encourage training activity, since employers should feel confi dent that they will be able to secure a return on investments in workers' skills. It is also possible that trade unions will be able to close off routes to competitiveness based on the intensive use of lowwage, low-skill labour (Nolan 1996) , thereby encouraging employers to up-grade their production techniques and invest more heavily in training. Finally, Williamson (1985: 254-56) has suggested that unions and collective bargaining may play important 'governance roles' where workers possess 'task idiosyncratic' (fi rm specifi c) skills. Williamson argues that such skills may provide workers with bargaining leverage and facilitate 'opportunistic haggling', particularly where rewards are individualized. Trade unions and collective agreements, by promoting collective interests, reduce the scope for opportunistic behaviour and thus serve as a positive force for effi ciency. Although Williamson does not pursue the point, his analysis implies that trade unions and collective bargaining, by discouraging opportunism, may encourage employers to invest in training directed at the development of 'task idiosyncratic' skills and knowledge.
A number of empirical studies have found evidence of a positive association between training and trade union presence. Osterman (1995) , for example, found that trade union presence in US workplaces was associated with an increased likelihood that 'core workers' would receive off -the-job training. Evidence for an association between the presence of trade unions and on-the-job training has also been found (Lynch 1992) . British fi ndings have painted a similar picture. Green et al. (1995 Green et al. ( , 1996 discovered that employees in workplaces where trade unions were recognized stood a signifi cantly higher chance of receiving training than those in non-unionized workplaces and that unionized workplaces were also more likely to have training plans. Similarly, Booth et al. (2003) , drawing on British Household Panel Survey data for the period 1991-96, found that the presence of a union was associated with an increased likelihood that workers would receive training and was also positively associated with the number of days of training that workers received and returns to training in the form of higher wage growth.
Further evidence has been supplied by the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) of British workplaces, which found that the availability of training opportunities and number of days training undertaken by employees, were positively associated with union recognition (Cully et al. 1998: 20) . In workplaces where trade unions were recognized, 62% of employees received training in the year prior to the survey, compared to 54% of employees in workplaces where no union members were present. Subsequent studies by Booth (2001, 2004) , which focused on the incidence of training provided by private sector employers, found that union recognition was associated with an increased likelihood that men and women in non-manual occupations, and men (but not women) in manual occupations, would receive training.
The evidence for a positive relationship between union presence and training, while substantial, is not uncontestable. One US study by Frazis et al. (2000) found that both the probability of training being provided and the probability of training being received were lower in unionized establishments than in non-unionized establishments. The authors noted that their fi ndings confl icted with those of earlier studies that found either that union presence was positively associated with training (Frazis et al. 1995) or that it had no statistically signifi cant eff ect (Lynch and Black 1998) and suggested that the inconsistency may have been due to variation in the composition of samples.
Despite the attempts that have been made to measure the impact of unions on training, the processes that link trade union presence to training outcomes have received relatively little attention. Economists have tended to treat the impact of unions on training as an unintended consequence of either the pursuit of wage bargaining objectives or union 'voice eff ects' and have largely ignored the direct infl uence that trade unions may seek to exert over training and development activities, the bargaining objectives of trade unions and employers and the content of resulting collective agreements. A small number of studies have, however, shed some light on these issues. A recent analysis of the 2004 WERS survey data by Stuart and Robinson (2007) found that the association between union recognition and positive training outcomes detected in the 1998 WERS continued to exist. The study found that employees in workplaces that recognized trade unions were 8% more likely to receive training than those in workplaces without recognition. However, Stuart and Robinson also suggest that it was managements' willingness to negotiate over training, rather than recognition per se, that had the greatest impact on training outcomes. They found that the likelihood of workers receiving training was not significantly enhanced where managers were willing to do no more than inform or consult union representatives. These fi ndings resonate with the earlier fi ndings of Heyes and Stuart (1998) , who demonstrated that training activity was enhanced where trade unions, in addition to achieving recognition, were actively involved in training decisions. Heyes and Stuart found that union members were more likely to receive training, have opportunities to train, achieve qualifi cations and enjoy a pay increase as a result of training in establishments where unions had an active role in training decisions. A positive association between trade union activity and training has also been found for Australia. Kennedy et al. (1994) , drawing upon data from the 1989-90 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS), found that trade unionism was associated with superior provision of formal training programmes. This was only the case, however, 'where unions [were] active within the workplace and not merely de jure representatives of the work-force' (Kennedy et al. 1994: 577) .
Other studies have assessed the scope for agreement and cooperation by employers and unions in relation to training. Policy makers have tended to depict training as a non-confl ictual issue, emphasizing that both employers and workers have much to gain from investments in skills and knowledge. It is assumed that training therefore represents fertile ground for the development of integrative approaches to collective bargaining and joint initiatives by unions and employers. In practice, however, employers may view trade unions' eff orts to develop a role in relation to training as a challenge to existing 'managerial prerogatives'. Even where collective bargaining takes place, employer and union interests may not coincide or be complementary (Heyes 2000 (Heyes , 2007 Rainbird et al. 2003) . Disagreements may arise in relation to the question of whether training is necessary, how much training is required, the nature of the skills and knowledge to be developed, how training is to be fi nanced, who should receive training, whether workers should have a 'right' to receive training and whether they should be rewarded for undertaking training. Studies have also found that managers often continue to regard decisions relating to training as being their prerogative, even where collective agreements have been reached or trade unions possess consultation rights (Stuart 1996; Rainbird and Vincent 1996; Winterton 2000; Rigby 2002; Giraud 2002) . Negotiating an agreement may be an important step towards enhancing training outcomes, but its impact is likely to depend to a considerable extent on the ability and willingness of unions and managers at local level to monitor and enforce it.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND CONTINUING VOCATIONAL TRAINING IN EUROPE

Context
The role of collective bargaining in regulating the provision of CVT at enterprise level has increased in importance in most EU member states over the past decade (Eurofound 2009). Social partner involvement in the regulation of training activity has also been a recurring theme in the development of EU social policy. The importance of collective bargaining and social dialogue relating to CVT has been emphasized in the context of the European Employment Strategy (EES), which is intended to encourage EU member states to work towards achieving the goals associated with the Lisbon Agenda. The desirability of employer and union involvement and cooperation in working towards training-related objectives has also been stressed in the context of the Education and Training 2010 agenda, the aim of which is to make education and training in Europe a 'world-wide reference' for quality (European Commission 2002: 50 In practice there tends to be a degree of co-ordination between levels (for example national agreements typically provide scope for company-level requirements to be addressed).
There is also variation in the extent to which national governments oblige employers to involve worker representatives in discussions and decisions relating to training. In the UK, a legal obligation upon employers to consult trade unions, exists only where a trade union has obtained recognition via the statutory procedures of the 1999 Employment Relations Act, in which case the union has a right to be consulted about the organization's training plan and receive information about the training that workers receive. These rights do not apply to trade unions that secure voluntary recognition from employers, nor do they apply to non-union employee representatives. French unions, by contrast, enjoy (at least in theory) substantial rights to contribute to decisions relating to continuing training, German works councils have co-determination rights in respect of certain matters relating to training and Spanish employers are required to inform worker representatives about training actions (but not negotiate). In the case of Ireland, tripartite national agreements have included commitments to promote lifelong learning and encouraged the development of 'partnership' approaches to training at enterprise level. However, evidence collected by SIPTU, the largest Irish union, suggests that partnership agreements have been rare, with just 11 enterprise-level agreements relating to training having been reached in the two year period following the implementation of the 2000 national agreement (Income Data Services 2002).
Training Activity
The extent to which enterprises in Europe train their employees can be judged from the fi ndings of the European Union's Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS). The survey, which has been conducted on three occasions (1994, 1999 and 2005) , covers all EU member states (plus Norway) and provides information about establishments according to their size and the sector in which they operate. For the purposes of the survey, the term Continuing Vocational Training (CVT) refers to training that is undertaken as a result of a decision made by the enterprise and is intended to result in the acquisition of new competences or the further development of existing competences. Initial training (for example apprenticeships) is excluded from consideration. The survey provides information about two forms of CVT: 'CVT courses' and 'other forms' (including on-the-job training, attendance at conferences and workshops and self-directed learning). Table 4 .1 provides information about training activity by enterprises, participation by employees in any type of training (that is, either of the two forms of CVT measured by the CVTS) and their participation in CVT courses specifi cally. For most EU member states there was little change between 1999 and 2005 in the proportion of enterprises that provided some form of CVT: some countries witnessed slight increases and others slight decreases. Portugal and Romania, however, both witnessed substantial increases in the proportion of training establishments, although it remains the case that training establishments tend to be less common in these countries than in most other EU member states. The only countries to have lower proportions of training-providing enterprises are Poland and Greece, although data are not available for all countries and, given the 1999 fi ndings, it is possible that Italy should also be added to this list. The pattern remains broadly the same when the focus is restricted to the provision of CVT courses.
The percentage of employees participating in CVT remained reasonably stable in most member states between 1999 and 2005, although there were substantial reductions in some (Denmark, Sweden and the UK) and substantial increases in others (for example, Czech Republic, Spain and Luxembourg). Perhaps more signifi cantly, the percentage of employees participating in CVT varies considerably between member states, ranging from 11% in Latvia to 59% in the Czech Republic in 2005. The variation applies as much to men as to women; indeed, when participation in CVT is examined on a country-by-country basis, the proportions of men and women who undertake CVT tend to be broadly similar. It should also be noted that when employees undertake training, its duration tends to be short. In 2005 the proportion of employees who undertook training lasting for at least fi ve days ranged from 5% in the case of Bulgaria to 25% in the case of Denmark, and only in Belgium, Denmark and Sweden did the proportion exceed one-fi fth. The EU's CVT survey also captures information about the extent to which enterprises are covered by negotiated collective agreements concerning CVT plans, policies or practices. Table 4 .2 provides information about the extent of collective agreements among establishments employing workers who participated in CVT courses in 2005.
Collective agreements relating to training were in evidence in a minority of establishments providing CVT in 2005. Across the EU-27, only 14% of training establishments were covered by a collective agreement relating to CVT and in some countries the proportion was much smaller (for example, 3% in the case of the Czech Republic). Only in Denmark and Norway did the proportion of training enterprises covered by a collective agreement relating to CVT exceed one-quarter. It is also clear that collective agreements in respect of training were proportionately more common among larger enterprises than smaller enterprises. Among the smallest establishments covered by the survey, collective agreements were most in evidence in countries in which inter-sectoral collective bargaining and national collective agreements on training tend to be found (the UK is a notable exception). Table 4 .3 provides information about the proportions of training enterprises with collective agreements by sector. In a number of countries, the 'fi nancial intermediation' sector (that is, banking and fi nance, pensions, insurance) stands out in terms of the relatively large proportions of training enterprises that have collective agreements when compared to other sectors.
The CVTS fi ndings also allow for an assessment to be made of the extent to which training outcomes in establishments that are covered by a collective agreement relating to CVT diff er from those in establishments that are not covered by an agreement. An association between the existence of a collective agreement and superior training outcomes can also be seen in relation to the number of paid hours of working time per employee that are spent participating in CVT courses. In general, the number of hours is higher in establishments that are covered by an agreement relating to CVT than in those without an agreement (Figures 4.3 and 4.4) . The only EU member states for which this association does not hold are Denmark (in the 1999 and 2005 surveys) and Malta, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Greece (in the 2005 survey).
Issues Covered by Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining in relation to training has covered a variety of issues. This section focuses on a number of the most common and important themes.
Addressing the needs of disadvantaged groups
A number of studies have demonstrated that opportunities to undertake training and development vary considerably across diff erent sections of the workforce. Studies have shown that employers deliberately diff erentiate between workers when providing access to training (Heyes and Stuart 1996: 13) , that workers with temporary employment contracts tend to receive less training than those with permanent contracts (European Commission 2005; Sprenger et al. 2008) , that part-timers fare less well than those who work full-time (Parent-Thirion et al. 2007) , that workers aged 25-39 receive more training than workers who are younger than 25 or older than 40 (and particularly those aged 55 or over) (ibid.) and that training activity is disproportionately focused on workers with the highest levels of initial education (Parent-Thirion et al. 2007; Sprenger et al. 2008) .
Trade unions have sought to ensure that opportunities to undertake training are extended to groups that are traditionally disadvantaged in respect of access to training. In 2007 the Dutch Christian Trade Union Federation, for example, brought forward proposals to off er workers on non-standard contracts additional training opportunities. This proposal received the support of a majority of the Dutch House of Representatives. Unions have also sought to improve opportunities for disadvantaged groups through collective agreements. For example, during 2007-08 a sectoral pact for the training of temporary agency workers was negotiated in Belgium. It was agreed that the costs of training would be shared between the training fund of the sector employing the worker and the sectoral training fund of the agency sector.
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Jason Heyes and Helen Rainbird -9781849809832 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/25/2019 03:04:36AM via free access designed to address health and safety concerns relating to temporary workers were signed in 2008 in the wood and construction industries. 4 As part of an eff ort to combat irregular and undeclared work, it was agreed that construction workers' schools (Scuole Edili) would run compulsory courses for new recruits.
In a number of countries, rights to take time away from work for the purpose of undertaking education or training have been introduced through national, inter-sectoral and sectoral collective agreements. In Portugal, concern over the country's weak skill base resulted in a national agreement on training, concluded in 2001. The agreement gave workers a right to certifi ed training, stipulated that 10% of a company's workforce should be undergoing training in any time period, and entitled unqualifi ed workers under 18 years of age to devote 40% of their working hours to training (Income Data Services 2001). In 1993, a private sector framework agreement in Denmark established a right for workers to take up to a fortnight's unpaid (subsequently paid) educational leave per year. Other examples include an agreement reached in 2001 in the Austrian paper and pulp sector, which provided an entitlement to one week of paid leave a year for training; the introduction during 2007-08 of an individual right to training in sub-sectors of the Belgian metal, distribution, food, merchant marine and fi nance sectors, and the glassworks sector; 5 and a three-year collective agreement concluded in 2005 by unions and employers in the Italian telecommunications sector, which provided workers with a right to training and set in motion the creation of a joint training body.
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Funding training
The introduction of a right to time away from work for the purpose of undertaking training typically requires an agreement on the respective contributions of employers, workers and the state to the fi nancing of periods of training leave. In 2003 the employers' organization (Union des Entreprises Luxembourgeoises) and the OGB-L and LCGB trade union confederations in Luxembourg reached an agreement that established an entitlement for workers to take 20 days of training leave over a period of two years and 80 days of training leave over the course of their career. The agreement contained provisions to facilitate participation in training courses through fl exible working time arrangements, allowing part-time working and the introduction of a 'time-credit' scheme. It also introduced unpaid leave and individual leave entitlements for workers attending courses leading to recognized qualifi cations. Employees become eligible for 'unpaid leave' of four weeks after two years service. Whilst on unpaid leave, employment contracts are suspended and workers return to employment once the course is completed. 'Individual training leave' can be used for attending courses, preparing and taking examinations and preparing reports. Employees are paid by the employer whilst on individual leave (although the employer is permitted to refuse to allow this type of leave) and the wage costs are reimbursed by the state.
In other cases, the costs associated with periods of paid training leave are either borne by employers or shared by employer and workers. A recent example of a shared approach to the funding of training is provided by the negotiated renewal in 2006 of the national agreement pertaining to the Italian chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector. 8 The agreement is the only example of an Italian national agreement that provides for annualization of working hours. Three days per annum are allocated to continuing training. The costs are shared between the company, which pays for 1.5 days (these are added to the annual work schedule), and workers (who contribute by deducting half a day from their time off in lieu or through the reduction of working hours envisaged by the agreement).
A further example is provided by the 2007 industry agreement between the Danish Central Organization of Industrial Employees (CO-Industri) and the Confederation of Danish Industries (Danski Industri, DI). 9 The agreement included provisions to establish a 'Competence Development Fund' (Industriens Kompetenceudviklingsfond) from April 2009, to which employers will contribute €35 per employee per week (a sum that will increase to €70 over the three year period of the agreement). The fund covers 85% of the employees' wage costs whilst they undertake two weeks of continuing training. Employees are allowed to select the training programme they wish to undertake, although the expectation is that the programme should relate to the manufacturing industry. The fund covers all employees in member companies of the employers' confederation (DI), a situation that was opposed by the CO-industri union, which had wanted the fund to cover its members alone. However, the DI insisted that, as Danish agreements are sectoral in character, the provisions of the agreement should apply to all employees working for the DI's member organizations.
The funding of training has often proved a contentious issue. Employers tend to be reluctant to fund the education and training of their employees where these do not directly relate to the 'needs' of the organization. On the other hand, union negotiators tend to be concerned that any training that is undertaken at the employer's behest should take place during normal working time and be paid for by the employer. Disagreements between employers and trade unions concerning the fi nancing of training have often proved hard to resolve (see Heyes 2007) . In the Netherlands, for example, the bi-partite Labour Foundation (a consultative body comprising union and employer organizations) recommended in 1997 that agreements be reached at sectoral and company level on training policy, facilities and participation by disadvantaged groups. In practice, however, it proved extremely diffi cult to negotiate agreements, largely because of employers' and trade unions' confl icting views concerning their respective responsibilities and the insistence of employers that they should not be expected to support training that was not directly job-related.
10 Similar problems were encountered in Norway in the wake of a 1998 agreement by the Norwegian employer and union representative organizations that workers should be given a statutory right to leave of absence for training and education. The right was incorporated into law in 1999, but no agreement was reached over the issue of fi nancing of subsistence payments for employees taking training leave and other elements of the reform programme.
11 Diffi culties of a related nature arose in the course of discussions between French employers and trade unions regarding the reform of training arrangements. A 1999 white paper proposed that individuals be granted a guaranteed entitlement to training and that certifi cation and validation of knowledge and experience be improved. Legislation was postponed in order to allow employer and union bodies an opportunity to discuss the issues. The subsequent discussions were marked by disagreements relating to the relative contributions of employers and employees to the cost of training and whether time spent undertaking training requested by an employer should be treated as working time. The talks broke down in 2001 and did not restart until 2003. An agreement was fi nally reached following concessions by the employers on the issue of funding.
Anticipating and coping with change
It is sometimes only in times of crisis and change, where workforce consent is of particular importance, that more radical approaches to involving unions in decision-making are considered (Rainbird et al. 2003: 47) . A notable development during the 1990s was the emergence of companylevel 'pacts for employment and competitiveness' (PECs), which Siefert and Massa-Wirth (2005: 218) defi ne as 'mutual accords between management and workforce representatives that resolve company-specifi c problems related to employment and competition'. PECs have tended to involve trade unions making concessions in respect of working practices in return for employer commitments relating to matters such as job security and improved training. Siefert and Massa-Wirth's study of German PECs found that agreements on additional training had been reached in 31% of establishments with a PEC and that 26% of such establishments had negotiated a guarantee to provide trainees with employment. Other (albeit less recent) evidence, however, has suggested that the focus of negotiations in respect of additional training has tended to be on the 'needs of the company' with more emphasis being given to 'compensations for training -employment, wages, working time -than on its priorities, contents or recipients '. 12 Training activity is often a complement to work reorganization and the introduction of new technology. In the case of the European steel industry, developments in technology have been associated with eff orts on the part of fi rms to recruit more highly-qualifi ed workers. According to Stroud and Fairbrother (2008) , it is these workers who have tended to benefi t most from 'progressive' training practices (those that involve opportunities to obtain qualifi cations, enhance individual 'employability' and so forth) while the education and training needs of older, poorly qualifi ed employees have been largely neglected. Stroud and Fairbrother also argue that across Europe it is the steel industry employers that have determined the content of training programmes and that skill-oriented strategies on the part of trade unions have tended to be absent. Even so, there have been instances of trade unions engaging in collective bargaining with steel sector employers in relation to training, with resulting benefi ts for workers. A recent study by Leisink and Greenwood (2007) examined the steel manufacturer Corus's eff orts to respond to intensifi ed competition and compared and contrasted the policies adopted in British and Dutch workplaces. In the Dutch case, an Employment Pact aimed at securing employee cooperation in relation to the implementation of change was negotiated in 1999 and subsequently integrated into a collective agreement. The agreement required every department to develop a training plan and submit it to the works council for approval. It also provided for those workers who took training courses agreed as part of a personal development plan to be 'compensated for their training in terms of money and time' (Leisink and Greenwood 2007: 347) . In the British case, by contrast, collective bargaining in relation to training did not occur. Leisink and Greenwood suggest that diff erences in the outcomes observed in the Netherlands and UK can be partly explained in terms of stronger support for collective bargaining and employee voice in the former country. They also argue that outcomes in both countries have been contingent on the eff orts and commitment of management and claim that negative attitudes on the part of some managers have made it hard for the Dutch unions and works councils to enforce the agreement.
The economic crisis that erupted in 2008 has provided an additional stimulus to collective bargaining in relation to training. In countries in which collective bargaining at sectoral level is well established there have been a number of instances of employers and trade unions negotiating training-related responses to economic diffi culties. An agreement concluded in 2009 for the Swedish manufacturing sector, for example, allowed for workers to be temporarily laid off from work while keeping their job and at least 80% of their normal salary, and for training to be provided in place of time away from work. Employer and trade union involvement in training reforms has been particularly pronounced in France, refl ecting the extent to which employers and unions are involved in the regulation of French CVT, particularly at the national and inter-sectoral levels (Méhaut 2010: 122-24) . In January 2009, French employers and trade unions signed a national intersectoral agreement on the development of training throughout working life, professionalization and securing career paths. The agreement resulted in workers being granted a right to transfer their existing individual right to training (droit individuel à la formation, DIF, introduced in 2003) should they lose their job as a result of either dismissal or redundancy. In these circumstances, workers will be able to use their accumulated rights to training while they are unemployed or, if they fi nd a new job, transfer them to their new employer (Alleki 2009 ). 1. 'Safeguard the competitive level of the companies concerned and promote the sustainable development of its existing production activities. 2. Preserve and develop the employability of its employees. 3. Develop the necessary competence and skills of its employees so as to enable them to adapt to the new economic and strategic challenges'.
TRANSNATIONAL TEXTS AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS
Three priorities for training are highlighted: fi rst, an identifi cation of competence and skill requirements for each area of activity; second, 'competence reviews' for individual employees, which are to take place at least once every three years and allow for actions (for example training) to be identifi ed; and third, the development of an 'active' training policy, involving opportunities for all categories of employee, the provision of information, support and guidance, validation of competences and qualifications and the 'preparation of an annual training plan based on the objectives identifi ed in local discussions on anticipatory management of employment and competence'. The agreement calls upon the 'social partners at local level/at the level of each entity' to implement the agreement's objectives, in accordance with the framework of national legislation, practices and collective agreements already in force. The agreement also highlights the need for effective social dialogue within the company's 'European Committee' (EWC) and the provision of information relating to the economic situation of the company and its strategy. Waddington (cited in EC 2008) suggests that 40% of joint texts concluded by EWCs and management include references to skills and training. While commentators have tended to express scepticism about the extent to which EWCs are likely to encourage the emergence of European-level collective bargaining (Hall and Marginson 2005) , the role of at least some EWCs would appear to have developed beyond the provision of opportunities for information sharing and consultation to encompass the negotiation of pan-European agreements. It should be borne in mind, however, that such agreements remain rare, enforcement of agreements at local level may be problematic, agreements tend not to have a basis in law and that employers remain opposed to the implementation of a European framework for transnational collective bargaining.
The reluctance of employers to engage in transnational bargaining notwithstanding, the past decade has seen the emergence of attempts by European trade unions to establish common cross-border bargaining objectives and improve information sharing (Sisson and Marginson, 2002) . A number of initiatives have so far been taken with regard to training and the European Metalworkers' Federation (EMF) has been particularly active in this regard. In 2001 the EMF 's annual conference debated a draft training charter, which was developed to tackle concerns that training agreements reached at company level had tended to prioritize the 'needs of the company', that training opportunities had therefore not been extended to broader education and training, and that access had not been open to all employees. The charter set out nine principles for improving access to training, including expectations that each individual should have the right to receive training, annual plans should be drawn up by the worker and the company, training should take place during working hours, and that workers should receive a document confi rming their participation on the course. The principles also emphasized that local employee representatives should be kept informed by the company of changing skill requirements and training schemes, a requirement that is embedded in a transnational agreement involving Schneider Electric (see Box 4.1). In 2005, the EMF launched an initiative to establish a common demand for workers to be given a right to fi ve days' training per year. The ETUC has since considered the possibility of establishing this as a common bargaining objective for the wider European trade union movement. 14 Other union federations have similarly specifi ed minimum standards and common priorities for vocational training. The 2000 UNI-Europa Graphical (UNI-EG) Congress adopted a plan for moving towards harmonization of collective bargaining, which included the development of minimum standards for vocational training (Leisink 2002: 113) . At its 2006 Collective Bargaining conference, the UNI-EG adopted a common demand relating to the right of individuals to receive training. Guidelines Particular attention should be paid to older workers and those who require assistance with reading and writing (iii) Sectoral collective agreements should stipulate that each company makes a contribution to training activities, with the amount to be based on its payroll costs (iv) Annual training plans for workers should be developed at company level. The plans should be developed on the bases of annual skills analyses, which should be undertaken by managers and union representatives and based on the needs of both the company and employees (v) Work-related training should take place during ordinary working time and be fully fi nanced by the company (vi) Managers should involve union representatives in discussions and decisions relating to training (vii) Vocational training should be cost-free for employees and every employee should have the right to receive a document that confi rms their participation (viii) Collective agreements should provide a framework, funding and possibilities to provide training in the event of restructuring and dismissals (ix) Collective agreements should also provide frameworks for the training of unemployed workers so as to tackle the problem of skills mismatch have been developed to further this goal. 15 These comprise a series of basic principles and objectives for union negotiators, some of which are summarized in Box 4.2 (opposite).
A further example of eff orts by unions to develop a coordinated approach to promoting continuing training is provided by the 'Doorn' group of unions from Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, which identifi ed lifelong learning as their common theme for 2002. The unions agreed to work towards three objectives: fi rst, making lifelong training and education the right of all employees; second, ensuring that employers' training activities be transparent and internationally comparable; and third, ensuring that training and education be viewed as investments.
CONCLUSIONS
Training has become an increasingly common issue for collective bargaining and there are compelling reasons for believing that joint regulation has positive consequences for training activities and outcomes. There is a substantial body of survey evidence to support the contention that training outcomes in unionized companies and workplaces tend to be superior to those in non-union environments. It is also clear that as a consequence of collective agreements, workers in a number of European countries and sectors have been granted rights to receive training and take time off work, sometimes on a paid basis, in order to undertake training. The impetus for the creation of such entitlements has come largely from European trade unions, which tend to regard training and lifelong learning as not only desirable activities in themselves, but also as essential prerequisites for the achievement of other bargaining objectives and wider social goals, including providing workers with routes into employment, enhancing the quality of work, improving job security and bringing about greater equality.
While the chapter has highlighted several examples of collective agreements that have led to improvements in various aspects of training, obstacles to the establishment of eff ective collective bargaining in relation to training must also be acknowledged. One obvious problem is that state support for collective bargaining and social dialogue in relation to training varies between countries, as do the resources and organizational strength of employers and trade unions. Woolfson (2008) has argued that the pursuit of the training-related objectives associated with the EU's social policy agenda is problematic in many of the CEE countries that have recently joined the EU because of the weak institutional basis for social dialogue, the ineff ectualness of government-sponsored national tri-partite councils (where they exist) and limited union representation and collective bargaining at sectoral and workplace levels. Potential diffi culties remain even where the institutional basis for collective bargaining and social dialogue is more solid. Achieving agreement in relation to the issue of funding for diff erent forms of training has often proved diffi cult, even in economies with strong traditions of social dialogue.
Quantifying the impact of collective bargaining in relation to training also remains a diffi cult task. Surveys of collective bargaining activity in Europe, such as the recent report by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions and CEDEFOP (Giaccone 2009 ) and a European Foundation study produced in 2002 (Rossi and Demetriades 2002) , have paid more attention to the extent of collective bargaining and forms of social partner involvement than to outcomes. Similarly, the European social partners' reviews of the impact of their Framework of Actions have devoted more attention to cataloguing activities than to outcomes (moreover, the extent to which the activities have occurred as a consequence of the Framework of Actions is far from clear).
Many of the empirical studies that have sought to quantify the impact of trade unions and collective bargaining on training have been produced by economists from the UK and USA. In attempting to explain the apparently benefi cial impact of unions on training, the importance of union voice eff ects has often been emphasized. The nature of such eff ects has, however, rarely been explored in depth. It might be that union voice helps to improve training activity by reducing labour turnover and, as a consequence, increasing employers' investment incentives, but demonstrating the importance of this causal relationship will require further research. It is also clear that union voice eff ects infl uence training in more direct ways. Industrial relations researchers have emphasized the importance of trade unions developing training-related bargaining objectives, having an ability to infl uence training decisions and their success in negotiating and enforcing collective agreements that relate to training. Yet detailed information about processes is similarly lacking. Future research might examine the processes through which the interests and bargaining objectives of unions and employers are determined, the tactics they adopt in negotiations, the nature and scale of improvements in training activity, the factors that infl uence the success and failure of agreements and how success or failure should be measured. Moreover, there is a need to develop the focus of research beyond the enterprise level. In the case of the UK and USA, which have provided the geographical focus for a number of empirical studies of trade unions, collective bargaining and training, a focus on the enterprise is understandable given that it is at this level that collective bargaining typically occurs. In many EU member states, however, sectoral and inter-sectoral collective bargaining remain important, although the increasing importance of the enterprise level is also apparent. It is likely that our understanding of the potential for collective bargaining to infl uence training would be enhanced by research that investigated the connections between these levels. Training activity within EU member states has also become subject to supra-national and cross-border infl uences. Prime among these have been the development of inter-professional and sectoral social dialogue at the European level, eff orts by trade unions to achieve cross-border coordination in relation to training and the various activities of trans-national corporations. These vertical and horizontal infl uences are contributing to the creation of more complex patterns of training regulation, or what Heyes and Rainbird (2010) refer to as the 'multi-level governance of training'. Analysing the nature of these new patterns of governance and their implications for training and development will be an important task for future research.
NOTES
